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1 Introduction 
There is a broad consensus in the finance-growth literature that, with few exceptions, 
there exists a positive long-run association between financial development and 
economic growth. This relationship is fairly robust to how financial development is 
measured – be it using indicators of banking or capital market development – and 
estimation methods, the latter ranging from cross-country to time-series and panel data 
techniques. Importantly, financial development has been shown to be one of the most 
robust determinants of economic growth, alongside most of the alternatives (e.g. King 
and Levine 1993). Thus, financial development may hold the key to economic 
prosperity and may, consequently, be a powerful mechanism for reducing poverty 
worldwide.1 As a result of this widespread consensus, the finance-growth literature has 
recently begun to shift its attention towards understanding why some countries have 
been able to develop their financial systems while some others have not. 
Interestingly, both the strength and the causal nature of the relationship between 
financial development and growth appear to vary substantially both across countries and 
over time.2 Thus, if international policy makers are looking for easy solutions that work 
in all countries and at all times (‘one-size fits all’ type answers), they are likely to be 
disappointed. An important, albeit disturbing, example of this is recent findings by 
Rioja and Valev (2004) and Demetriades and Law (2004) which suggest that the 
relationship between finance and growth is very weak in low-income countries. Thus, 
financial development may well be ineffective in promoting growth and, because of 
this, may be ineffective in alleviating poverty in those countries where poverty is 
particularly concentrated or acute. However, even in these cases it is important to 
understand why financial development is ineffective, which may help inform 
policymaking. 
This paper aims to improve our understanding of both the sources and effectiveness of 
financial development, with due consideration of how both may vary across countries 
and over time. To do so, the paper takes stock of what we already know and identifies 
areas where further research is needed. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
reviews relevant literature on the likely sources of financial development, highlighting 
areas of further research. Section 3 offers some new insights on the sources of financial 
development, based on some recent findings by Demetriades and Law (2005). Section 4 
reviews what we know on the effectiveness of financial development in promoting 
growth, speculating as to why it may vary across countries and highlighting areas of 
further research. Finally, Section 5 summarises and concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
1   Dollar and Kraay (2001) provide extensive evidence which suggests that economic growth worldwide 
has been a powerful mechanism for reducing poverty. 
2   For a recent survey see Demetriades and Andrianova (2004).   2
2  Sources of financial development 
It is instructive to categorise the likely sources of financial development as follows: 
—  policy measures such as financial liberalisation and bank privatisation; 
—  institutions, such as rule of law and prudential regulation;  
—  political economy factors, such as opposition to reform and openness of 
industrial and banking incumbents. 
While the above taxonomy is somewhat arbitrary – for example some political economy 
factors may well be the reason why some countries choose not to liberalise their 
financial systems – it is still helpful to utilise it for expositional purposes, while 
recognising that there may well be inter-linkages between the various sources. 
2.1 Policy  measures 
The early literature on financial development (e.g. McKinnon 1973 and Shaw 1973), 
highlights ill-conceived government interventions, such as interest rate controls, high 
reserve requirements and capital controls, as the main source of financial under-
development. McKinnon and Shaw argued that ceilings on deposit and/or lending rates, 
because of high inflation rates, frequently resulted in negative real rates of interest, 
discouraging saving and leading to an excess demand for loanable funds. Consequently, 
the volume of investment declined. The problem was exacerbated by governments that 
interfered in credit allocation, providing credit to ‘priority sectors’, frequently a 
euphemism for cronyism and corruption. Thus, the productivity of capital declined. 
Governments also imposed excessively high reserve requirements on banks, usually at 
low or even zero interest rates, in order to finance their own deficits cheaply. This acted 
as a tax on the banking system, resulting in further depression of deposit rates, thereby 
creating greater disincentives for financial saving. Removing interest rate ceilings, 
reducing reserve requirements and abolishing priority lending – in other words, freeing 
the financial system from government interventions – was seen as critical in delivering 
financial development. For a time, these policies became the mantra of the IMF and the 
World Bank, whose officials prescribed (and frequently imposed) ‘financial 
liberalisation’ to many developing countries. 
The reality of financial liberalisation in the 1970s and early 1980s was, however, 
different from what was predicted by the McKinnon-Shaw literature. Real interest rates 
soared to unprecedented levels (sometimes in excess of +20 per cent), as a result of 
fierce competition for funds and excessive risk-taking by both firms and banks. When 
borrowers became unable to repay their loans, many banks failed. Governments were 
therefore forced to (re-)nationalise them, resulting in very large fiscal costs. Instead of 
greater financial development, there was financial fragility; instead of more prosperity 
there was more poverty. In a classic paper entitled ‘Good-bye Financial Repression, 
Hello Financial Crash’, Diaz-Alejandro (1985) provides a first attempt at analysing the 
failure of financial liberalisation in Latin America. Subsequent analysis of what went 
wrong in these reforms (Villanueva and Mirakhor 1990) highlights adverse 
preconditions, such as macroeconomic instability (large fiscal deficits and high 
inflation) and inadequacies in banking supervision. McKinnon (1991) suggests that 
incorrect sequencing of reforms was at the root of the problem. He suggests that 
financial liberalisation should be preceded by real sector reforms, including   3
privatisation of state enterprises, aimed at ensuring that relative prices adequately reflect 
economic scarcities. He also advocates reducing deficits and inflation before embarking 
on reforms, so that price distortions that may be associated with high inflation are 
removed. At the same time, domestic financial liberalisation (i.e. interest rate 
deregulation and lowering of reserve requirements) should precede liberalisation of 
capital flows, with restrictions on long-term flows, such as FDI, being lifted first while 
those on volatile short-term flows being lifted last. 
McKinnon (1991) also suggests that adequate regulation and supervision of banks is 
necessary in order to contain moral hazard problems in the banking system. Adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems are exacerbated in the aftermath of interest rate 
liberalisation, especially when banks are not sufficiently well capitalised. Under-
capitalised banks have incentives to take excessive risks, especially if they are protected 
by government safety nets. It is often believed that such safety nets encourage banks to 
behave imprudently, since they allow them to benefit from a one-way (unfair) bet 
against the government. By making speculative loans at very high interest rates they 
stand to make very large profits, assuming of course that the borrowers do not default. If 
the borrowers do default, the bank will not suffer the full cost of these defaults if it is 
bailed out by the government. Even if the bank is allowed to fail, the depositors may not 
suffer if they are protected by deposit insurance. Thus, depositors have no incentives to 
monitor bank managers when they are protected by deposit insurance. Bank 
shareholders have no incentive to monitor bank managers either when they do not have 
much capital at stake. In the extreme, bank shareholders may even benefit from 
gambling behaviour by the managers, if they have little or no capital at stake (i.e. when 
the bank has little or no net worth). In such circumstances it may be in their interests to 
instruct bank managers to gamble (with taxpayer's money) this is sometimes referred to 
as ‘gambling for resurrection’ (Llewellyn 1999). 
Several papers provide empirical evidence that substantiates the uncanny relationship 
between financial liberalisation and financial crises. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) analyse the determinants of the probability of banking crises in 53 countries 
during 1980-95. They find that financial liberalisation has a very large and statistically 
significant positive effect on the probability of banking crisis, even after controlling for 
many other possible determinants of banking crises. The magnitudes are quite startling: 
the probability of a banking crisis increases up to five times following financial 
liberalisation. The increase in this probability is lower in more developed economies or 
when institutional quality is high. Their institutional quality indicators include law and 
order, bureaucratic delay, contract enforcement, quality of bureaucracy and corruption. 
The authors argue that the influence of financial liberalisation on financial fragility 
works its way through reduced bank franchise values. Financial liberalisation intensifies 
competition which reduces the value of a banking license to shareholders and 
exacerbates moral hazard in the form of excessively risky lending. They also present 
evidence which suggests that while financial liberalisation has a positive effect on 
financial development, banking crises have a negative effect. They find that the two 
effects offset each other in countries that liberalise from a position of positive real 
interest rates, while in those that started from a repressed position the effect of financial 
liberalisation on financial development outweighs that of the banking crisis. They 
conclude by arguing in favour of gradual financial liberalisation, to be accompanied or 
preceded by institutional development.   4
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) carry out an empirical analysis of the ‘twin’ – banking 
and currency – crises, in which they argue that financial liberalisation and/or increased 
access to international capital markets played a major role in the first phase of such 
crises. Specifically, they examine the empirical regularities and the sources of 76 
currency crises and 26 banking crises. They find that banking and currency crises are 
closely linked in the aftermath of financial liberalisation, with banking crises beginning 
before currencies collapse. Currency collapse exacerbates the problems in the banking 
system further, making the ‘twin crises’ a lot more severe than crises that occur in 
isolation. Financial liberalisation or increased access to international capital markets 
fuel the boom phase of the boom-bust cycle that precedes crises. This phase is 
associated with increased access to financing and the formation of asset price bubbles. 
The bust is attributed to overvalued exchange rates, declining exports, and a rising cost 
of credit, all of which create vulnerabilities in the financial system. The authors see the 
draconian reductions in reserve requirements that accompany financial liberalisation as 
one of the main factors that trigger lending booms. They also suggest that high interest 
rates result in increased risk taking, in line with earlier literature. The authors conclude 
that there is a compelling case for strengthening banking regulation and supervision to 
‘allow countries to sail smoothly through the perilous waters of financial liberalization’. 
And that the Asian crisis of 1997-98, like earlier crises ‘remind us that capital inflows 
can on occasion be too much of a good thing’ (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999: 496). 
Stiglitz (2000) offers further insights into the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, as well as 
on other recent crises, including Russia and Latin America, drawing on his experience as 
Chief Economist of the World Bank. He suggests that premature financial and capital 
market liberalisation – in the sense of not first putting in place an effective regulatory 
framework – was at the root of these crises. He also suggests that global economic 
arrangements are fundamentally weak. Stiglitz’s analysis highlights some of the 
difficulties that the sequencing literature has in explaining the East Asian crisis, which 
ensued soon after these countries liberalised their financial systems. By conventional 
definitions, these countries had good economic policies and sound financial institutions. 
They did not have fiscal deficits; they enjoyed very high growth rates for long periods, 
and their inflation rates were low. Their macroeconomic fundamentals were (or at least 
appeared to be) very strong. They were also thought to have reasonably respectable 
systems of banking regulation and supervision. Stiglitz emphasises the destabilising 
influence of short-term capital flows in his analysis, arguing that ‘there is not only no case 
for capital market liberalization, […] there is a fairly compelling case against full 
liberalization’ (Stiglitz 2000: 1076). His analysis of why capital market liberalisation 
produces instability, not growth, identifies the following fallacy in the pro-liberalisation 
arguments, namely that ‘financial and capital markets are essentially different from 
markets for ordinary good and services’. He points out that capital and financial markets 
are ‘information-gathering’ markets, which mean that standard results for competitive 
markets derived from models with perfect information are not applicable. He also argues 
that capital flows are pro-cyclical; therefore the argument that the opening of capital 
markets would allow diversification and enhance stability is deficient. Finally, he 
challenges the notion that any destabilising effects emanating from capital account 
liberalisation are transitory, while the benefits are permanent, by alluding to the unit root 
literature, which suggests that shocks to output can be long-lasting. The debate has now 
shifted, Stiglitz argues, to the type of interventions that might be necessary in order to 
stabilise short-term capital flows, rather than their desirability as such, with these actions 
being endorsed by the IMF itself.   5
Stiglitz (1999) elaborates on the weaknesses of the institutional financial architecture, 
which amplifies the destabilising effects of financial liberalisation. Specifically, he 
highlights the role of the tight monetary policies recommended by the IMF to Asian crisis 
countries, in the aftermath of the crisis. Moreover, these policies, which were aimed at 
stabilising exchange rates, had the opposite effect. This was because high interest rates 
raised the probability of corporate bankruptcies. This, in turn, made international lenders 
more reluctant to renew or rollover their loans to highly leveraged East Asian 
corporations. There have been several attempts to address the issue of weak financial 
architecture, many of these from World Bank and IMF economists. However, a major 
empirical issue that needs to be tackled when addressing this question is that in any 
reasonable economic model interest rates and exchange rates are simultaneously 
determined. Hence, identifying the effects of policy tightening is extremely difficult. 
Caporale et al. (2005) exploit the heteroskedasticity properties in the relevant time-series 
for these variables in order to identify the system. Using a bivariate vector autoregression 
model, they find that while tight monetary policy helped to defend the currencies 
concerned during tranquil periods, it had the opposite effect during the Asian crisis. 
A number of authors continue, however, to propagate the benefits of financial 
liberalisation, focusing primarily on the effects of capital account liberalisation on stock 
returns and the cost of equity capital, using event studies. Bekaert and Harvey (2000), 
for example, measure how capital account liberalisation has affected the equity return-
generating process in 20 emerging markets. They use a variety of methods to determine 
liberalisation dates, including official liberalisation dates, dates of first issues of country 
funds or American Depository Receipts, which may signal a change in access to 
international capital markets, and econometric methods to identify structural breaks in 
the series. They find that dividend yields decline after liberalisations, but the effect is 
always less than 1 per cent on average. They also find that there is no significant impact 
of liberalisation on unconditional volatility. In a series of other studies (see Bekaert and 
Harvey 2003), they challenge Stiglitz’ critique of capital account liberalisation, dubbing 
as ‘odd’ the whole discussion concerning increased volatility. They review evidence 
which suggests that the ratio of investment to GDP increases following liberalisation, 
while the ratio of consumption to GDP does not increase. Durham (2000), however, 
finds that many of the results in this literature are sensitive to (i) alternative 
liberalisation event dates and (ii) conditioning on other determinants of stock returns 
suggested by the literature on stock market anomalies. 
Evidence from time-series studies on the effects of financial liberalisation on financial 
development is mixed. While it is quite common to find that the real interest rate has a 
small positive effect on financial development, there is also evidence to suggest that the 
direct effects of ‘repressive’ policies on financial development are sometimes positive 
and quite large. Demetriades and Luintel (2001) provide time-series evidence from 
South Korea – one of the fastest growing economies in the world – in which an index of 
financial repression is found to have a large positive effect on financial development. 
They explain this finding by arguing that the Korean banking system behaved like a 
cartel when interest rates were deregulated. Using a monopoly-bank model they show 
that mild repression of lending rates increases the amount of financial intermediation. It 
is also worth noting that domestic financial liberalisation in South Korea was not 
followed by financial instability. The Korean crisis occurred well after domestic interest 
rates were liberalised; it followed the opening up of short-term capital flows, which 
destabilised the banking system. In sharp contrast to their findings on South Korea in an 
earlier study of the Indian banking system, Demetriades and Luintel (1997) find that   6
financial repression had large negative effects on financial development, over and above 
the retarding influence of low real rates of interest. The difference in results is attributed 
as reflecting institutional differences and differences in the severity of repression. While 
mild financial repression may turn out to have positive effects under certain conditions, 
severe financial repression is likely to result in financial under-development not only 
due to large negative real interest rates, but also because of other disincentive effects. 
This is also further evidence that ‘one-size fits all’ may not work: policies which 
promote financial development in a certain context may not work in other contexts. 
Another form of government intervention in the financial system that may have 
implications for financial development and growth is government ownership of banks. 
Government owned (henceforth ‘state’) banks provide an effective means for politicians 
to influence the allocation of credit, allowing them to support firms and enterprises that 
may further their political interests. This view, known as the ‘political view of state 
banks’, has a clear policy implication: privatising state banks can improve the efficiency 
of credit allocation and, consequently, can have positive effects on the quality and 
quantity of investment. Privatisation of state banks is also likely to promote financial 
development, since private banks would be in a better position to attract funds into the 
banking system than inefficient state banks. La Porta et al. (2002) examine the 
relationship between government ownership of banks, financial development and 
economic growth using a cross-country data set. They find that government ownership 
of banks is negatively correlated with both financial development and growth. The 
estimated coefficients are quite large: they suggest that a 10 per cent reduction in the 
share of banking assets owned by the government is associated with an increase in 
growth by 0.25 per cent per annum. Assuming that the relationships are causal, the clear 
policy implication is that the privatisation of government owned banks would yield very 
large benefits in terms of additional financial development and economic growth. La 
Porta et al. also report bi-variate regressions that suggest that government ownership of 
banks is higher when institutional indicators, including property rights and government 
efficiency, are weak. However, this highlights the possibility of reverse causation: if 
government ownership of banks is the result of institutional weaknesses, then lower 
growth rates and financial under-development may be the result of the same institutional 
weaknesses. Thus, privatising state banks without addressing the institutional 
deficiencies that brought them about may not have the positive effects of growth 
predicted by La Porta et al. (2002). 
Andrianova et al. (2003; henceforth ADS), provide further insights into the relationship 
between institutions, state banks and financial development using a locational model of 
banking in which there are two types of private banks – ‘honest’ and ‘opportunistic’ – 
and a state bank. Private banks are assumed to offer more competitive interest rates to 
depositors than the state bank. In the absence of deposit-contract enforcement problems 
they are therefore always preferred by depositors. However, if deposit contract 
enforcement is weak and the number of opportunistic banks is large, then some 
depositors would prefer to place their savings in the state bank, which offers a risk-free, 
albeit lower, rate of return. ADS derive three types of equilibria in their model: (i) a 
‘high’ equilibrium in which institutions are strong, only private banks exist and 
opportunistic banks honour their contract; (ii) an ‘intermediate’ equilibrium in which 
private banks and the state bank co-exist and opportunistic banks find it profitable to 
breach their deposit contracts, because of relatively weaker contract enforcement, and 
(iii) a ‘low’ equilibrium in which only the state bank exists because contract 
enforcement is weak and the proportion of opportunistic banks is high. They show that   7
in the intermediate region the proportion of state bank deposits declines when 
institutional quality increases. They also show that privatisation of the state bank in the 
low equilibrium region results in financial disintermediation: i.e. no private bank would 
emerge to fill the gap, as depositors will not trust it. ADS extend their model to allow 
for politically motivated subsidies to the state bank. They show that the higher the level 
of these subsidies, the smaller the ‘high’ equilibrium region. Thus, state banks may 
feature in equilibrium, even when there are no enforcement problems, because they are 
able to offer more competitive deposit rates than some private banks. ADS also provide 
a variety of empirical tests of the relationships predicted by their model, using data from 
83 countries. They find that institutional quality indicators, including financial 
regulation, rule of law and disclosure rules, are much more strongly and robustly 
correlated to the share of state banks than proxies for politically-driven subsidies. They 
conclude that the privatisation of state banks is, at best, unnecessary since it is better to 
build institutions that foster the development of private banks and remove subsidies 
from state banks. At worse it is detrimental since, when institutions are weak, it will 
almost certainly lead to financial disintermediation. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of policy measures is that the case 
for less government intervention in the financial system resulting in greater financial 
development is far from proven. It presupposes the presence of an institutional 
framework that aims at containing market imperfections, such as moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Thus, institutions and political economy factors, not less government 
intervention, may well be the true fundamental determinants of financial development. 
2.2 Institutions 
An effective system of financial regulation and supervision would ensure that banks 
have adequate risk management systems and that bank shareholders are penalised if 
banks take excessive risks. Capital requirements that accurately reflect risk-taking by 
banks are one mechanism for achieving this. Increased transparency regarding banks’ 
risk management systems, as well as increased disclosure concerning exposure to large 
risks, can help to increase market discipline on bank managers and may well contain 
such risk taking. Institutions such as contract enforcement and the rule-of-law also 
matter, since they have implications for the protection of investors’ property rights. 
Much of the literature on institutions, however, examines their effects on growth, not on 
financial development.3 
La Porta et al. (1998; henceforth LLS), examine legal rules covering the protection of 
(minority) shareholders and creditors, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. 
They draw on the work of comparative legal scholars, who classify national legal systems 
into major families of law, even though national differences remain within the same 
families. These scholars identify two broad legal traditions: civil law and common law. 
The civil law tradition, which is the oldest and most influential, originates in Roman law. 
It relies heavily on legal scholars to ascertain and formulate rules, statutes and 
comprehensive codes, as a primary means of settling disputes. Within the civil law 
                                                 
3   For example, Mauro (1995), Svensson (1998), and Acemoglu et al. (2001) provide macroeconomic 
evidence that suggests a negative impact of insecure property rights on economic growth and 
investment.   8
tradition, there are three common families of laws: French, German and Scandinavian. 
The French Commercial code was written in 1807 and was ‘exported’ by Napoleon’s 
armies to other countries in central Europe; eventually it was also exported to French 
colonies in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. The German Commercial Code, written in 
1897, had an influence in Central and Eastern Europe, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The 
Scandinavian family, considered less a derivative of Roman law than French and German 
law, is considered sufficiently distinct from the other families by legal scholars, but has no 
influence outside the Nordic countries. The common law family, which originates in the 
law of England, is formed by judges in the resolution of specific disputes. Precedents 
from judicial decisions, not contributions by scholars, form the basis of common law. 
Common law has spread to the former British colonies, including the US, Canada, 
Australia, India, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ireland, Hong-Kong, etc. LLS find that 
common-law countries generally have the strongest shareholder protection, while civil-
law countries have the weakest. Within the civil law group, French civil law countries 
offer the worst legal protection to shareholders. Similar results are found for the 
protection of creditors. French civil law countries compensate for weak investor 
protection, through mandatory dividend to shareholders and legal reserves. LLS also find 
that legal origins have a significant influence on legal enforcement, with common law 
countries and Scandinavian civil law countries having the best quality of law enforcement 
while French civil law countries having the worst. They do, however, find that the main 
determinant of legal enforcement is GDP per capita: richer countries have higher quality 
of law enforcement. Thus, rich countries within the French civil law group, such as 
France and Belgium, could well offer better law enforcement than poor common law 
countries. 
La Porta et al. (1997) examine the influence of legal origins on financial development, 
mainly focusing on the development of capital markets. They use the same sample of 49 
countries as LSS and find that French civil law countries have the least developed capital 
markets, especially as compared to common law countries. Their indicators of financial 
development include: stock market capitalisation/GNP, number of firms relative to 
population size, initial public offerings (IPOs) relative to population and debt/GDP. Their 
empirical findings suggest that civil law countries have lower levels of capital market 
development than common law countries. However, there are no significant differences in 
relation to banking sector development. In the regressions that use debt/GDP as the 
dependent variable, once the authors control for creditor rights, only the Scandinavian 
civil law dummy is negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. 
What could be concluded from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) is that civil-law countries, 
which seem to offer less legal protection to minority shareholders and creditors, have 
less developed capital markets and greater concentration of ownership at both industry 
and firm level. However, the implications of legal origins for the development of the 
banking system, which is perhaps the most important part of the financial system for 
many developing countries, are less clear cut. Indeed, Rajan and Zingales (2003) find 
that French civil code countries were no less financially developed in 1913 and 1929 
than common law countries, and only started to lag behind after the Second World War. 
Moreover, legal traditions may themselves be determined by historical, cultural, socio-
economic and political factors, so it is not easy to draw out any policy implications from 
these results. Legal origins are, in fact, highly correlated with a number of other 
institutional quality indicators, including the efficiency of the judiciary, bureaucratic 
quality, generalised level of trust, etc., so it is difficult to disentangle the effects of legal 
origins on financial development from those of other institutions (Zingales 2003).   9
Finally, even if we were to accept that it is the legal system that determines financial 
development and ultimately growth, there remains the question of how to transform a 
legal system from the supposedly inferior French civil code to the supposedly superior 
common law one. There are, therefore, many unanswered questions as regards the 
relationship between law and finance, offering fertile ground for more research. 
2.3  Political economy factors 
The key to solving the puzzle of why many countries remain financially underdeveloped, 
according to Rajan and Zingales (2003), is the lack of political will, or the capture of 
politicians by interest groups opposed to financial openness. In other words, financial 
development comes about only if the ruling elite welcome it. The economic argument 
constructed by Rajan and Zingales in support of this conjecture is as follows. Openness to 
either international trade or international capital, while beneficial for the country's welfare 
in stimulating the development of its financial and product markets, breeds competition 
and thus threatens the rents of incumbents. When financial markets are underdeveloped, 
two types of incumbents enjoy rents and therefore may oppose openness and financial 
development. Established industrial firms, or ‘industrial incumbents’, are in a privileged 
position when obtaining external finance due to their reputational capital and their ability 
to provide collateral. Their rents are generated because new firms with profitable business 
projects have to team up with an industrial incumbent in order to obtain financing. 
‘Financial incumbents’, in turn, capitalise on their informational advantage which stems 
from relation-based financing and become monopolists in providing loans to firms when 
problems of poor disclosure and weak contract enforcement raise fixed costs of new 
financial entrants. Financial development improves transparency and enforcement, thus, 
reducing the barriers to entry and undermining not just the profits of incumbents who 
have to operate in a more competitive environment, but the source of their rents since 
entrants are able to effectively operate without any help from incumbents. Despite the 
benefits it brings (after all, better disclosure rules improve operating conditions for all 
firms – existing and new), financial development threatens both the profits and the 
positional rents of the incumbents. 
The way to remove incumbents’ opposition to financial development, Rajan and Zingales 
argue, is to simultaneously open product and capital markets. More intense competition 
from foreign entrants, following liberalisation of either trade or capital flows alone, will 
only intensify incumbents’ opposition to financial development. For example, trade 
liberalisation under protected capital markets would reduce industrial incumbents’ 
competitiveness and profits, thus, increase their demand for cheaper and larger loans to 
defend their domestic market position. Their opposition to financial development – which, 
if came about, would further undermine incumbents’ competitiveness, this time vis-a-vis 
the domestic entrants – would now be even stronger. Incumbent financiers’ resistance to 
financial development, when capital markets are protected while product markets are 
liberalised, is likely to remain the same: after all, relation-based financing favours dealing 
with existing large clients and these are incumbent industrialists. Similarly, protected 
product markets in combination with free international capital flows, create a stronger 
resistance to financial development from the incumbent financiers (who are forced now to 
compete for their best and largest industrial clients with foreign financial institutions) 
while leaving industrial incumbents’ incentives for financial development unchanged. 
There is little use in additional external finance available from tapping international 
capital markets when the economy is closed to trade. In contrast, trade liberalisation   10
accompanied by freeing of capital flows, forces the incumbent industrialists and 
financiers to make the best of the liberalised markets in order to cope with the competitive 
pressure from foreign and domestic entrants. Lower profits at the industrial incumbents 
and their greater need for external finance now force them to explore possibilities of 
tapping the international capital markets. If unsuccessful, these industrialists would in fact 
now support financial innovations that aid greater transparency, thus, improving their own 
access to domestic finance. Incumbent financiers, being forced to lose some of their best 
clients to foreign competition and at the same time to accept lower profitability of their 
remaining clientele, are now forced to seek new lending opportunities among young 
industrial firms which are less known and possibly more risky. Financing these new firms 
is likely to be unattractive to foreign financiers, but would create incentives for domestic 
incumbent financiers to support the improvements in, and development of, domestic 
financial markets. In sum, trade and capital liberalisation aligns the interests of industrial 
and financial incumbents with those of the rest of the economy and financial development 
becomes possible. 
The empirical evidence provided by Rajan and Zingales focuses on a variety of 
relationships which suggest that the combination of trade and capital openness are, 
indeed, correlated with greater financial development. Their findings, while consistent 
with their conceptual arguments, provide, at best, indirect evidence about the 
importance played by interest-group politics in financial development. Moreover, their 
sample of countries, driven by data availability in the pre-Second World War period, is 
rather limited, and in some of the regressions the sample size is as low as 17 
observations. Thus, while the ideas in Rajan and Zingales (2003) by themselves 
undoubtedly advance our understanding of political economy factors, the empirical 
evidence that is provided by the same authors is less than convincing, leaving ample 
scope for further empirical research. Further questions that need to be addressed, both 
theoretically and empirically, include the following. How do special interest groups 
come into existence? What institutions and policies – ‘political pre-conditions’ for 
institutions and financial development – moderate the influence of interest groups? If 
the most effective way to curb incumbents’ opposition to financial development is by 
means of increased openness and competitiveness, then what is the best combination of 
policies that could pave the way for rapid institutional development? What is the role of 
the state for shaping the institutional infrastructure in a way that limits the power of the 
interest groups and the scope for capture of the government policies by special 
interests? These are all exciting questions that await researchers’ attention. 
3  Sources of financial development: some new evidence 
Demetriades and Law (2005) draw on the literature reviewed in section 2 to specify the 
following financial development equation: 
FD = f (RGDPC, R, ROL, LO, DEMOC, POL, BC, OP)  (1) 
where FD is financial development; RGDPC is real GDP per capita; R is the real 
interest rate; ROL is rule of law; LO is legal origin; DEMOC is democracy score, POL 
is political stability; BC is bank concentration and OP is openness, which is measured 
by total trade (imports + exports) over GDP. The specification of the equation reflects 
all the considerations outlined in section 2. Real GDP per capita is a conditioning   11
variable that purports to filter out the influence of general economic development on the 
level of financial development; in a growing economy, the financial sector may grow 
faster relative to the size of the economy because the demand for financial services 
grows more than proportionately to income (finance may be a luxury good). The 
financial policy stance, including financial liberalisation, is usually captured by the 
presence of the real interest rate in the equation. A positive coefficient will signify 
the McKinnon-Shaw effect: higher real rates of interest enhance financial development. 
Rule of law and legal origin would capture the influence of institutions, while 
democracy, political stability and to a certain extent openness would capture the 
influence of political economy factors. Finally, bank concentration, which captures the 
influence of banking market structure, may also to some extent reflect political 
economy considerations: less competitive banking systems may be the result of 
powerful ruling elites that restrict entry and contain financial development. 
Equation (1) is estimated by utilising the cross-country OLS robust standard estimator. 
The data set utilised consists of cross-country observation for the period 1990–2001. 
Two different categories of financial development indicators are employed, namely 
banking sector development and capital market development. The banking sector 
indicators are the ratios of liquid liabilities, private sector credit and domestic credit 
provided by banking sector to GDP. The capital market development indicators are the 
ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP and the ratio of the number of companies 
listed to total population. Both capital market indicators are only available for high-
income and middle-income countries. The main sources of these annual data are the 
World Development Indicators.4 The data set for the rule of law indicator employed in 
this study was assembled by the Centre for Institutional Reform and Informal Sector 
(IRIS) of the University of Maryland from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG),5 a monthly publication of Political Risk Services (PRS). The democracy score 
and political stability (‘durable’) variables are obtained from Polity IV datasets, which 
is made available by Center for International Development and Conflict Management 
(CIDCM).6 The above three variables are scaled from 0 to 10 which indicate that higher 
values imply better rule of law, democracy score and political stability. The bank 
concentration is measured by the ratio of total assets of the three largest banks in each 
country to total banking sector assets, which is obtained from Beck et al. (2003b).7 The 
annual data of real GDP per capita, real deposit interest rate (deflated by inflation) and 
total labour force, are collected from the World Development Indicators. 
Table 1 reproduces some of the results from Demetriades and Law (2005). It reports 
OLS regressions of Equation (1) with all the variables included. In all five models real 
GDP per capita enters with the expected positive coefficient and is statistically   
 
                                                 
4   World Bank CD-ROM 2003. 
5   The website of the ICRG is http://www.icrgonline.com. The ICRG’s risk ratings have been cited by 
experts at the IMF, World Bank, United Nations and many other international bodies as a standard 
against which other ratings can be measured. 
6   The website of the CIDCM is http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity. 
7   Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000), Levine (2000) and Beck et al. (2003a) have employed this data set 
in the empirical analysis.   12
Table 1 OLS regressions with robust standard errors 
Dependent variable: financial development (sample period: 1990–2001) 






































































































































R-square 0.66  0.70 0.64  0.68 0.65 
N  64 64 64  54 41 
Notes:  Figures in the parentheses are the t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
Source:  Demetriades and Law (2005). 
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significant, though only at the 10 per cent level in Models 3 and 4, in which domestic 
credit and stock market capitalisation are the dependent variables, respectively. The real 
interest rate enters with a positive coefficient in the three models that utilise banking 
development indicators, as expected, but it is statistically insignificant in Models 1 
and 2 and significant at the 10 per cent level in Model 3. Thus, the McKinnon-Shaw 
hypothesis that higher real interest rates resulting from financial liberalisation will 
enhance financial development receives little, if any, support by the data. Rule of law 
enters with a positive and statistically significant coefficient in all five models, 
suggesting that institutions are important determinants of financial development. Bank 
concentration is generally not significant, except in Model 5 where it suggests that less 
competitive banking systems are positively linked to firms resorting to the stock market 
to obtain finance. The democracy score seems to have a mild positive influence on 
financial development, but is significant only in Models 1 and 2 and at the 10 per cent 
level. Political stability is positive and significant at the 5 per cent level in three models, 
suggesting that political instability is a deterrent to financial development. Openness is 
positive and significant in three of the models, which is consistent with the Rajan-
Zingales hypothesis. Finally, the legal origin variables are by and large insignificant 
except for English legal origin, which has a positive and significant coefficient in 
Models 2 and 4, which utilise private sector credit and stock market capitalisation, 
respectively, as the dependent variables. 
These findings indicate that both institutions and political economy factors may be the 
true fundamental sources of financial development. However, as usual, OLS cross-
country results may suffer from reverse causality. Indeed, in additional regressions, 
Demetriades and Law (2005) use the initial values of rule-of-law and find that the 
significance of this variable is lost. This suggests that both rule-of-law and financial 
development may be jointly determined by another variable. Recent work by Beck et al. 
(2003a) examining the historical determinants of financial development, suggests that 
the variable in question may be geographical in nature. Specifically, Beck et al. test the 
endowment hypothesis of Acemoglu et al. (2001), which postulates that geography and 
the disease environment encountered by European settlers were critical in shaping 
institutional development. Alongside this, they also test the law and finance hypothesis 
of LLS. Using a sample of 70 former colonies, they find that the initial endowment 
theory of Acemoglu et al. explains more of the cross-country variation in financial 
development than the law and finance hypothesis. While this research advances our 
understanding of the historical origins of financial development, its policy implications 
for countries that remain financially underdeveloped today are not immediately obvious. 
Since the wheels of history cannot be turned back and geography cannot be changed, 
does it mean that there is no hope for financially underdeveloped economies today? We 
think not. If better institutions do indeed hold the key for financial development, it must 
surely be possible to adapt and strengthen them, even where the legacy of European 
settlers and geography has been unfavourable. Some questions that emanate from this 
frontier of the literature are the following. Is geography relevant today in shaping the 
future of institutions? Are financially under-developed economies plagued by extractive 
institutions even today? If so, to what extent would improvements in the disease 
environment today help to improve institutions that are critical for financial 
development?   14
4  Effectiveness of financial development 
In their recent empirical analysis of the effectiveness of financial development across 
different groups of countries, Demetriades and Law (2004) estimate the following 
growth equation using panel cointegration techniques (see Pesaran et al. 1999): 
t i i
t i i,t i t i i t i i i i t i
g n
K FD INS FD t RGDPC
, , 6
, i 5, , 4 , , 3 , , 2 , 1 , 0 ,
) ln(                              
ln INS)  x  ln( ln ln ln
δ β
β β β β β β
+ + +
+ + + + + =   (2) 
where RGDPC is real GDP per capita; FD is a financial development indicator; INS is 
an indicator of institutional quality; K is the stock of capital investment or physical 
capital accumulation; n is the rate of labour growth; g is the rate of technology growth 
or technological progress, and δ is the rate of depreciation. 
Their data set consists of a panel of observations for 72 countries for the period 1978–
2000. The sample countries are split into three groups: high, middle and low-income in 
accordance with the World Bank classification.8 Annual data on real GDP per capita, 
real gross capital formation, total labour force and three alternative financial 
development indicators (liquid liabilities, private sector credit and domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector, all expressed as ratios to GDP) are from the World 
Development Indicators. All these data are converted to US dollars based on 1995 
constant prices. The data set on institutional quality indicators they employ was 
assembled by the IRIS Center of the University of Maryland from the ICRG, discussed 
earlier. Following Knack and Keefer (1995), Demetriades and Law (2004) use the 
following five indicators to measure the overall institutional environment: (i) corruption 
which reflects the likelihood that officials will demand illegal payment or use their 
position or power to their own advantage; (ii) rule of law which reveals the degree to 
which citizens are willing to accept established institutions to make and implement laws 
and to adjudicate dispute; it can also be interpreted as a measure of ‘rule obedience’ 
(Clague 1993) or government credibility; (iii) bureaucratic quality which represents 
autonomy from political pressure, strength and expertise to govern without drastic 
changes in policy or interruptions in government services, as well as the existence of an 
established mechanism for recruitment and training of bureaucrats; (iv) government 
repudiation of contracts which describes the risk of a modification in a contract due to 
change in government priorities, and (v) risk of expropriation which reflects the risk 
that the rules of the game may be abruptly changed. The above first three variables are 
scaled from 0 to 6, whereas the last two variables are scaled from 0 to 10. Higher values 
imply better institutional quality and vice versa. The institutions indicator is obtained by 
summing the above five indicators.9 
                                                 
8   The World Bank classifies economies as low-income if the GDP per capita is less than US$755; 
middle-income if the GDP per capita is between US$755 and US$9265 and high-income economies if 
the GDP per capita is more than US$9265. 
9   The scale of corruption, bureaucratic quality and rule of law was first converted to 0–10 (multiplying 
them by 5/3) to make them comparable with the other indicators. For robustness checks, Demetriades 
and Law (2004) also used different weights for each indicator to construct the aggregate index, 
obtaining similar estimates.   15
Table 2 Panel data estimations 
Dependent variable: real GDP per capita (72 countries, 1978–2000) 





















































Log-likelihood 3141.33  2631.92  1075.78 
H Test for long-run Homogeneity  4.11 (0.53)
   





















































Log-likelihood 3169.64  2631.39  1050.96 
H Test for long-run Homogeneity  5.82 (0.32)
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Log-likelihood 3166.85  2648.85  996.59 
H Test for long-run Homogeneity  3.44 (0.63)
   
Notes:  All equations include a constant country-specific term. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics 
except for Hausman tests (H), which are p-values. ***
 and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 
5% levels, respectively. N x T = 1656. 
Source:  Demetriades and Law (2004) 
 
Tables 2 through 5 reproduce some of the results in Demetriades and Law (2004). 
Table  2 reports the estimates of Equation (2) on the entire set of countries, while 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 report estimates for high-income, middle-income and low-income 
countries, respectively. 
The Hausman test (see Hausman 1978) in Table 2 indicates that the data do not reject 
the restriction of common long-run coefficients, therefore only the pooled mean group 
(PMG) estimator results reported in Tables 2 through 5 are discussed. The PMG 
estimates in Table 2 reveal that both financial development and institutional quality are 
statistically significant determinants of long-run growth. In addition, the interaction 
term enters with a large positive and statistically significant coefficient. This suggests 
that the marginal effects of both finance and institutions on growth may be higher than 
has been suggested by earlier literature. Financial development has both direct and 
indirect effects on growth, which broadly speaking reflects the effects of financial 
deepening (size effects) and the influence of institutions (quality effects). Similarly, 
institutional development has both direct and indirect effects on growth, with the latter 
depending on the size of the financial system. In other words, institutional development 
has a greater payoff in terms of growth when the financial system is more developed. 
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Table 3 Pooled mean group estimations of high-income countries 
Dependent variable: real GDP per capita (24 countries, 1978–2000) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 





























































PRI -  0.20 
(2.79)***
 




DOC -  -  0.14 
(1.51)
 
- -  0.11 
(1.45)
 








DOC x INS  -  -  -  -  -  0.32 
(1.89)*
 












































Notes:   All equations include a constant country-specific term. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics 
except for Hausman tests (H), which are p-values. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% denoted by 
***, ** and * respectively. 
Source:   Demetriades and Law (2004) 
 
The PMG results for high-income countries in Table 3 show that while both the 
financial development indicators and institutional quality retain their positive sign, they 
are no longer statistically significant in all models. Two of the financial development 
indicators, namely liquid liabilities and private sector credit, remain statistically 
significant, while domestic credit is no longer significant. Institutional quality is no 
longer statistically significant in any of the six models at the 5 per cent level – it is, 
however, significant at the 10 per cent level in the first three models. The interaction 
term, however, performs better. It is statistically significant at conventional levels in 
two out of three models and significant at the 10 per cent level in the third. The 
coefficients on the financial development indicators in Models 4, 5 and 6 are much 
lower than those in the corresponding models in Table 2. The interaction terms,   18
however, are slightly higher than in the corresponding models in Table 2. These 
findings seem to suggest that even within high income countries financial development, 
as measured by liquid liabilities or private credit, has positive albeit smaller direct 
effects on growth than in the entire sample. Its indirect effects, which depend on the 
quality of institutions, are, however, if anything, somewhat larger than in the entire 
sample. Given that institutional quality is higher in high-income countries, financial 
development may overall still have large positive effects on economic growth. The 
same cannot be said for institutional quality, the effects of which are now largely 
through the financial system. Thus, while institutional improvements appear to display 
diminishing returns, financial development remains an important engine of growth even 
for developed countries. 
Table 4 Pooled mean group estimations of middle income countries 
Dependent variable: real GDP per capita (24 countries, 1978–2000) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 





























































PRI -  0.40 
(4.57)***
 




DOC -  -  0.27 
(3.53)***
 
- -  0.36 
(1.88)*
 








DOC x INS  -  -  -  -  -  0.45 
(5.30)***
 












































Notes:   All equations include a constant country-specific term. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics 
except for Hausman tests (H), which are p-values. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% denoted by 
***, ** and * respectively. 
Source:  Demetriades and Law (2004)   19
The PMG results for middle-income countries are reported in Table 4. The direct effects 
of financial development on economic growth are larger and more significant than in 
the high-income group in all of the corresponding six models. This finding is consistent 
with Rioja and Valev (2004), who also find a much stronger growth-enhancing effect of 
financial development in middle-income countries compared to high-income countries. 
Institutional quality also has a positive and highly significant effect on economic growth 
in all six models. Thus, the findings in Demetriades and Law (2004) provide support for 
the argument that good institutions are more important for growth in less developed 
countries (Rodrik 1997). In addition, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term in 
Models 4, 5 and 6 is both large and highly significant. These findings seem to suggest 
that both finance and institutional quality have large direct and indirect effects on 
growth. Improving both finance and institutional quality in middle-income countries is, 
therefore, likely to boost economic growth much more than in high-income countries. 
Table 5 Pooled mean group estimations of low-income countries 
Dependent variable: real GDP per capita (24 countries, 1978–2000) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 



























































PRI -  0.10 
(2.33)**
 




DOC -  -  0.08 
(0.98)
 
- -  0.13 
(1.38)
 








DOC x INS  -  -  -  -  -  0.23 
(2.27)**
 











































Notes:   All equations include a constant country-specific term. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics 
except for Hausman tests (H), which are p-values. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% denoted by 
***, ** and * respectively.   20
Table 5 reports the results for low-income countries. Financial development is found to 
have very small direct effects on growth. The estimated coefficients are not only small 
but they are also statistically insignificant for two of the three indicators. Only the 
private credit indicator is significant but its coefficient is only 0.10 compared to 0.40 for 
middle-income countries and 0.20 for high-income countries. Institutions, however, 
have a large positive and significant direct effect on growth in these countries. The 
estimated coefficients on institutional quality are roughly twice the size of those 
obtained for middle or high-income countries. The estimated coefficients of the 
interaction terms are positive and highly significant; however, they are almost half the 
size of the corresponding ones obtained for the middle-income group. These findings 
suggest that policy makers in low-income countries should primarily be focussing on 
improving institutional quality, which is likely to have both direct and indirect effects 
on growth. Financial development, especially if it boosts credit to the private sector, is 
also likely to have significant payoffs in terms of growth, but even these to a large 
extent depend on the presence of good institutions. 
Demetriades and Law (2004) conclude that financial development has larger effects on 
growth when the financial system is embedded within a sound institutional framework. 
This is found to be particularly true for poor countries, where more finance may well 
fail to deliver more growth if institutional quality is low. For poor countries, 
improvements in institutions are likely to deliver much larger direct effects on growth 
than financial development itself. They are also likely to have positive indirect effects 
through the financial system, particularly when the latter is providing large amounts of 
credit to the private sector. 
5  Summary and conclusions 
While we now know a lot more about the sources of financial development and its 
effectiveness in delivering more growth, there remain many unanswered questions 
offering fruitful ground for further research. Specifically, the case that financial 
liberalisation can deliver substantial benefits in terms of both financial development and 
growth remains largely unproven. Indeed, much of the evidence suggests that financial 
liberalisation can have major de-stabilising effects on financial markets, including major 
financial crises like the 1997-98 one in Asia, which undermine the confidence of market 
participants. The question that remains largely unanswered is how long it takes 
economies to recover from such events, if indeed they do recover. Therefore, despite its 
likely short-to-medium term destabilising consequences, is financial liberalisation, on 
balance, beneficial to the development of financial markets in the long run? The case for 
related policy measures like bank privatisation is even less convincing. While 
government ownership of banks may be correlated negatively with both financial 
development and growth, this negative correlation may well reflect institutional 
weaknesses, which may leave governments with little choice but to have controlling 
interest in banks. If ignored, such weaknesses can undermine the success of bank 
privatisation programmes, leading to financial disintermediation and, subsequently, to 
re-nationalisations of problem banks. Thus, the negative correlation between 
government ownership and financial development that is found in the data may well 
reflect unsuccessful attempts at bank privatisations. Further research on this topic would 
be fruitful, especially if it provides in-depth case studies of the history of government 
ownership of banks.   21
Institutions and political economy factors appear to hold the key to understanding why 
some countries have succeeded in developing their financial systems while others have 
not. Institutions appear also to influence the effectiveness of financial development 
itself, which suggests that poor countries may be stuck in a bad equilibrium, in which 
weak institutions inhibit growth both directly and indirectly, through under-developed, 
low-quality, finance. There are of course many unanswered questions on detail, relating 
to the precise role of important institutions such as law in finance, as well as the means 
by which countries can overcome unfavourable starting positions such as geographical 
disadvantages. More research on these issues could, therefore, prove very fruitful in 
highlighting mechanisms that can make finance more effective in delivering both 
growth and poverty reduction. 
References 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J. A. Robinson (2001) ‘The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’, American Economic 
Review, 91: 1369–1401. 
Andrianova, S., P. O. Demetriades and A. Shortland (2003) ‘State Banks, Institutions 
and Financial Development’, Discussion Paper in Economics, University of 
Leicester, 02/13. 
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt and R. Levine (2003a) ‘Law, Endowments, and Finance’, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 70: 137–181. 
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt and R. Levine (2003b) A New Database on Financial 
Development and Structure. Word Bank Research Dataset. 
Bekaert, G. and C. Harvey (2000) ‘Foreign Speculators and Emerging Equity Markets’, 
Journal of Finance, 55: 565–614. 
Bekaert, G. and C. Harvey (2003) ‘Emerging Markets Finance’, Journal of Empirical 
Finance, 10, 3–55. 
Caporale, G. M., A. Cipollini and P. O. Demetriades (2005) ‘Monetary Policy and the 
Exchange Rate During the Asian Crisis: Identification through Heteroskedasticity’, 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 24(1): 35–53. 
Clague, C. (1993) ‘Rule Obedience, Organizational Loyalty, and Economic 
Development’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149: 393–414. 
Demetriades, P. and S. Andrianova (2004) ‘Finance and Growth: What We Know and 
What We Need to Know’, in C. Goodhart, (ed), Financial Development and 
Economic Growth: Explaining the Links. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Demetriades, P. and S. H. Law (2004), ‘Finance, Institutions and Economic Growth’, 
University of Leicester Discussion Paper in Economics, No. 04/5. 
Demetriades, P. and S. H. Law (2005), ‘Sources of Financial Development: Some 
Cross-Country Results’, mimeo, University of Leicester.  
Demetriades, P.O. and K. B. Luintel (1997) ‘The Direct Costs of Financial Repression: 
Evidence from India’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 79: 311–20.   22
Demetriades, P.O. and K. B. Luintel (2001) ‘Financial Restraints in the South Korean 
Miracle’, Journal of Development Economics, 64(2): 459–79. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache (1998) ‘The Determinants of Banking Crises in 
Developed and Developing Countries’, IMF Working Paper No 106.  
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and R. Levine (2000) ‘Bank Concentration: Cross-Country 
Evidence’. World Bank Global Policy Forum Working Paper. 
Diaz-Alejandro, C. (1985) ‘Good-bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash’, 
Journal of Development Economics, 19(1): 1–24. 
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2001) ‘Growth is Good for the Poor’, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 2587. Reprinted in A. Shorrocks and R. van der Hoeven 
(eds) Growth, Inequality and Poverty, Oxford: Oxford University Press for UNU-
WIDER. 
Durham, J. B. (2000) ‘Emerging Stock Market Liberalisation, Total Returns, and Real 
Effects: Some Sensitivity Analyses’, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, 
Working Paper 48. 
Hausman, J. (1978) ‘Specification Tests in Econometrics’, Econometrica, 46: 1251–71. 
Kaminsky, G. L. and C. M. Reinhart (1999) ‘The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking 
and Balance-of-Payments Problems’, American Economic Review, 89(3): 473–500. 
King, R. G. and R. Levine (1993) ‘Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108: 717-37. 
Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1995) ‘Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-country 
Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures’, Economics and Politics, 207–27. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer (1998) ‘Law and Finance’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 106(6): 1113–55. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer (2002) ‘Government Ownership of 
Banks’, Journal of Finance, 57(1): 265–301. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1997) ‘Legal 
Determinants of External Finance’, Journal of Finance, 52: 1131–50. 
Levine, R. (2000) ‘Bank Concentration: Chile and International Comparisons’, Central 
Bank of Chile, Working Paper No 62. 
Llewellyn, D. (1999) ‘The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation’, Financial 
Services Authority Occasional Paper No 1. 
Mauro, P. (1995) ‘Corruption and Growth’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3): 
681–712. 
McKinnon, R. I. (1973) Money and Capital in Economic Development. Brookings 
Institution: Washington, DC. 
McKinnon, R. I. (1991) The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in 
the Transition to a Market Economy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.   23
Pesaran, M. H., Y. Shin and R. P. Smith (1999) ‘Pooled Mean Group Estimation of 
Dynamic Heterogeneous Panels’. Journal of American Statistical Association, 94: 
621–34. 
Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales (2003) ‘The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial 
Development in the Twentieth Century’, Journal of Financial Economics, 69: 5–50. 
Rioja, F. and N. Valev (2004) ‘Does One Size Fit All? A Re-examination of the Finance 
and Growth Relationship’, Journal of Development Economics, 74(2): 429–47. 
Rodrik, D. (1997) ‘Total Factor Productivity Growth Controversies, Institutions and 
Economic Development in East Asia’, National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper No 5914. 
Shaw, E. S. (1973) Financial Deepening in Economic Development. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Stiglitz, J. (1999) ‘Interest Rates, Risk, and Imperfect Markets: Puzzles and Policies’, 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 15(2): 59–76. 
Stiglitz. J. (2000) ‘Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth and Instability’, 
World Development, 28(6): 1075–86. 
Svensson, J. (1998) ‘Investment, Property Rights and Political Instability’, European 
Economic Review, 42(7): 1317–42. 
Villanueva, D. and A. Mirakhor (1990) ‘Strategies for Financial Reforms: Interest Rate 
Policies, Stabilization, and Bank Supervision in Developing Countries’, IMF Staff 
Papers, 37(3): 509–36. 
Zingales, L. (2003) ‘The Weak Links’, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 
85(4): 47–52. 
 